Agents as intermediaries: When do they compete with their suppliers? by Corones, Stephen
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Corones, Stephen (2014) Agents as intermediaries : when do they com-
pete with their suppliers? Australian Business Law Review, 42(1), pp. 50-
55.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/66911/
c© Copyright 2014 Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
1 | P a g e  
 
Agents as intermediaries: when do they compete with their suppliers? 
By 
Stephen Corones 
Queensland University of Technology 
Introduction 
In cases involving allegations of price fixing under the former s 45A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth), it was necessary to prove that at least two parties to the arrangement or understanding at 
issue were “in competition with each other”. The same requirement is contained in the cartel 
provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) that replaced s 45A. The so-called 
“competition condition” is set out in s 44ZZRD (4) of the CCA. Where a supplier enters into vertical 
supply arrangements with agents or brokers, problems can arise if the supplier also has a 
downstream presence. At that functional level there may be a horizontal and therefore competitive 
dimension, and the competition condition may be satisfied. In such circumstances, great care will 
need to be taken in any discussions between the supplier and its downstream agents or distributors 
about the prices, discounts, allowances, rebates or credits that the agent or distributor may charge.  
Whether agents or brokers competed with their suppliers in vertical supply arrangements arose for 
consideration in two decisions handed down by the Federal Court in Brisbane. In the first, Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2013] 
FCA 1206 (18 November 2013), Dowsett J found that ANZ did not attempt to dictate prices to a 
mortgage broker in breach of s 45 of the TPA, in part because the independent mortgage broker was 
acting on behalf of the ANZ bank as an agent and not in competition with the bank.  
In the second case, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Limited (No 2) 
[2013] FCA 1313 (6 December 2013), Logan J found that while Flight Centre was a travel agent acting 
on behalf of three international airlines for the purposes of the sale of air travel, Flight Centre also 
acted as an intermediary in the distribution services market and was a horizontal competitor with 
the airlines in that market. Flight Centre attempted to enter into arrangements with each airline to 
prevent them from “undercutting” it and thereby eliminate the difference between fares available 
on the airline’s website for direct purchase by air travel passengers, and fares available for purchase 
through Flight Centre as a travel agent.  
Agency relationships and competition law 
These two cases highlight the importance of the correct characterisation of the relationship between 
parties in vertical supply arrangements. An agency relationship exists where a supplier entrusts 
another to sell the supplier’s goods on its behalf. The agent does not acquire title to the goods which 
can be returned to the supplier if unsold, and the risk of loss (that the goods will not sell), and the 
risk of a decline in price is borne by the supplier. The word “supply” is defined in s 4(1) of the CCA to 
include in relation to goods “supply (including re-supply) by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or 
hire-purchase”. The passing of title in the goods is not essential to satisfy the definition of supply, 
and it is arguable that a supplier that delivers goods to a consignee or agent supplies them within 
the meaning of s 4(1) of the CCA. However, according to mainstream competition policy a true agent 
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is to be regarded as merely forming part of the supplier’s undertaking. The supplier and agent 
together constitute one economic unit in the same way as an employer and employee, or parent and 
related body corporate. Section 47(12) provides that the prohibition of exclusive dealing in s 47(1) of 
the CCA does not apply where a body corporate restricts dealings by a related body corporate. 
Support for this view is also to be found in the decision of the High Court in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd 
v Williams and Hodgson Transport Pty Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 395 in which a brewer entered into an 
arrangement under which a carrier (QXR) would deliver beer on its behalf to the premises of 
retailers (publicans) throughout Queensland. There was no contractual relationship between the 
publican and QXR. Gibbs CJ (with whom Wilson and Dawson JJ agreed) stated: “It was of course clear 
that if the appellant had itself carried the beer there would have been no exclusive dealing within 
s 47. The position was not altered when the appellant arranged for a third person to carry on its 
behalf. In those circumstances the services were acquired by the appellant and not the retailer”. 
Brennan J (with whom Deane J agreed) stated: “The position is no different from what it would be if 
the brewer's own employees delivered the beer”. 
Where, however, the agent is not a true agent and acts as an independent contractor or 
intermediary, the CCA may apply. An independent contractor or intermediary is most likely to be 
involved where the contracting party described as an “agent” is required to hold stock in which 
property has passed, the risk of loss due to non-sale has passed to the agent or the “agent” is free to 
determine prices and other terms of business. This is the approach taken in the United States. See 
United States v General Electric, 272 US 476 (1926) and Illinois Corporate Travel v American Airlines, 
889 F 2d 751 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 US 919 (1990) in the context of US antitrust law. It is 
also the approach taken in the European  Union. See DaimlerChrysler v Commission Case T-325/01 
[2005] ECR II-3319, [2007] 4 CMLR 559 and Section II (paragraphs [12] to [21] of the European 
Commission’s Vertical Guidelines OJ [2010] C130/1 in the context of European Union Competition 
Law. 
ACCC v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Limited  
ANZ entered into an agreement with the Australian Finance Group Ltd (AFG) (the originator 
agreement) for the marketing of ANZ loan products. AFG was an independent contractor and had no 
authority to bind ANZ. Mortgage Refunds Pty Ltd (Mortgage Refunds) was an independent mortgage 
broker. Mortgage Refunds entered into an agreement (the User Agreement) with AFG under which 
persons nominated by Mortgage Refunds were accredited for the purposes of receiving and 
processing ANZ loan applications. Mortgage Refunds and its brokers were not tied to ANZ and 
supplied loan products provided by other lenders. Mortgage Refunds provided support services to 
individual brokers operating under its banner, including the supply of office facilities, training, 
operating systems and advertising. Mortgage Refunds operated under a business model which 
involved the payment to the borrower of part of the commission otherwise payable to the broker by 
the lender. 
The ACCC alleged that in the case of 11 home loans made by ANZ between 2004 and 2006, ANZ 
made and gave effect to an arrangement whereby it would allow Mortgage Refunds to continue to 
be accredited to offer ANZ mortgage products only if Mortgage Refunds agreed to limit any refund 
paid to its customers in respect of arranging ANZ home loans to $600. This would allow ANZ 
branches to match the refund deal offered by Mortgage Refunds if the ANZ branch chose to waive 
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the ANZ loan establishment fee. The ACCC alleged that this amounted to price fixing in 
contravention of s 45, by the operation of s 45A of the TPA which deemed price fixing arrangements 
between competitors to be in breach of s 45.  
The ACCC argued that there was an “Australia-wide market for the supply of loan arrangement 
services to members of the public by loan providers, franchisees and brokers” (at [31]). There were 
loan providers such as ANZ and the agents and franchisees of these loan providers. These in-house 
and tied channels supplied only the products of their respective employers or franchisors. In 
addition, there were brokers who supplied the financial products or services of numerous lenders. 
The ACCC alleged that ANZ and Mortgage Refunds were horizontal competitors in the market for the 
provision of loan arrangement services. Dowsett J stated (at [28]): “The ultimate question for 
resolution is whether ANZ competed with the brokers in supplying loan arrangement services”.  
An expert economist, Dr Fitzgerald, gave evidence that there was a market for “intermediary 
services” – a functional market which connected eligible borrowers with the retail mortgage lending 
arms of the banks, and that the brokers competed in this market providing a distribution channel to 
the banks for their loan products. Dr Fitzgerald considered that the market was two-sided – one for 
the supply of services to lenders and the other for the supply of services to borrowers. Furthermore, 
he considered that the market for intermediary services included the in-house or tied distribution 
channels of loan providers. Importantly, Dr Fitzgerald observed in his expert’s report that the 
brokers were in competition with ANZ’s tied channels because they were “…capturing (in the form of 
commissions paid to them by lenders) margins that would otherwise be retained by the distribution 
units within a banking group, either the mortgage lending business unit or the branches or other 
arms”. (See [269]). 
Dowsett J found that ANZ did not compete with the brokers in supplying loan arrangement services. 
His Honour largely rejected the ACCC’s submissions. In particular, (at [582]) his Honour found that 
“…brokers met needs which in-house and tied channels did not, and could not meet”. The ACCC’s 
pleaded market was not a market for loan products, but rather a market for loan arrangement 
services. Some potential borrowers would go to brokers because the industry evidence was that 
brokers held themselves out as offering advice and information concerning a wide range of 
products, supplied by a wide range of lenders and assistance with completing loan applications. They 
were seen as being independent of lenders and therefore able to provide more independent advice 
that the lender’s in-house or tied channels. His Honour held (at [586]): 
…the agent or employee has a primary duty to his or her principal or employer to sell one or 
other of its products. A broker has no such duty, although he or she nonetheless has an 
interest in selling a product to each customer. It is incorrect to assert that in each case, the 
duties are “practically indistinguishable”. 
The ACCC’s case depended on a distinction between the supply of loan products and the supply of 
services associated with loan products. Brokers supplied services to potential borrowers assisting 
them to choose a lender and a loan product that best met their particular needs. However, Dowsett 
J found (at [631-632]) that the ANZ branches and employees did not supply loan arrangement 
services to potential borrowers; rather they supplied sales services to ANZ. Similarly, the ANZ 
franchisees while appearing to be more independent than the ANZ branches were held (at [633]) to 
be effectively in the same position as the branches, providing sales services to ANZ and not services 
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to potential borrowers. Accordingly, his Honour held (at [634]) that “there was no market in which 
the franchisees supplied loan arrangement services”. 
Dowsett J concluded (at [638]) that:  
“ANZ branches and franchisees did not participate in any market in which the brokers 
provided loan arrangement services to potential borrowers. That finding leads to the 
conclusion that ANZ was not, in any relevant sense, in competition with Mortgage Refunds. 
Thus, s 45A is not engaged. The proceedings must be dismissed”. 
ACCC v Flight Centre Limited (No 2) 
By way of background, there were two ways in which air travel passengers (customers) might 
purchase tickets. First, airlines used the internet as a means of advertising and notifying would-be 
passengers of the availability of flights. Customers could deal directly with the international airline 
and purchase a ticket online and make payment by credit card using the airline’s website. 
Alternatively, the customer could purchase a ticket from the airline through a travel agent. The 
agents accessed fares from the airlines through a Global Distribution System (GDS). At the time there 
were three GDS available for sue by travel agents, Galileo, Amadeus and Sabre. As regards this 
second method of obtaining a ticket, Logan J (at [35]) described the role of the travel agent as being 
part of a “distribution chain”: 
 …which commences with airlines making seats on particular flights to particular 
destinations at particular fares available to a GDS, continues through the accessing 
of such a flight at such a fare by a travel agent for a retail customer of that travel 
agent and concludes with the booking by the travel agent of that flight, the payment 
of that fare by the customer and the remission of a nett amount by or on behalf of 
the travel agent to the airline. Thus, it is not inaccurate to describe one service 
which a travel agent provides as a “distribution service” but this is neither the only 
service offered by a travel agent nor is a travel agent the only link as between airline 
and would-be passenger in a distribution chain. 
Flight Centre was a “true agent” in the sense that it did not operate its own flights. It did not buy 
tickets in bulk from the airlines for re-sale to customers. It did not assume the risks and duties of a 
reseller. It did not take “title” to an airline seat or assume the risk that a particular seat may go 
unsold. This was acknowledged by Logan J who held (at [21] and [35]) that so far as the sale of air 
travel was concerned, the relationship between the respective airlines and Flight Centre was that of 
principal and agent. Approximately 80- 85 per cent of tickets were “sold” by travel agents on behalf 
of airlines. The commission received by the travel agent for performing this distribution service for 
the airline was 9 per cent of the air fare. 
However, Flight Centre also provided travel advice services to air travel passengers. These included 
advice about particular destinations abroad, accommodation, tours, travel insurance and ground 
transport options at those destinations, the available flights to reach given overseas destinations, 
the booking on behalf of the customer of air travel to those destinations as well as accommodation 
and the receipt of payment. Flight Centre was described by Logan J (at [23]) as an “international air 
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travel intermediary” or “middle man”: in offering a particular flight it did so on behalf of the airline 
concerned; in booking that flight it did so on behalf of the customer. 
 
The ACCC alleged that Flight Centre and the airlines to which it provided services supplied booking 
and distribution services to customers and competed with each other for the “retail or distribution 
margin”. It alleged that on six occasions Flight Centre had attempted to induce the making of a price 
fixing arrangement or understanding with three international airlines (Singapore Airlines, Malaysia 
Airlines and Emirates) in the market for the distribution, booking and retail sale of international air 
travel which was separate from the market for air travel. Flight Centre argued that there was only 
one market, namely the market for the supply of international air passenger services. According to 
Flight Centre, it acted as an agent for the airlines. It did not compete with them, and could not be 
found to have attempted to fix prices.  
Logan J stated (at [144]):  
 
If the supplier of goods or services has the ability to ‘cut out the middle man’ and deal 
directly with a consumer of those goods or services, instead of that dealing being 
undertaken by that middle man, that supplier is, to the extent it avails itself of that ability, in 
competition with the middle man”. 
His Honour held that there were two separate but closely inter-related markets: first, a market for 
the provision by air carriers of air travel itself, (a flight between given destinations); and secondly, a 
market for distributing the flights made available by air carriers to passengers or customers 
(distribution services market). Flight Centre and the airlines were competitors in the second market.  
Logan J concluded (at [142]): 
They were competitors not because Flight Centre was also a supplier of air travel but rather 
because an airline could, if it chose, make the knowledge of the availability of its flights 
known directly to would-be passengers and undertake directly with them the booking of 
those flights. These were services which were substitutable for those provided by a travel 
agent such as Flight Centre. An airline could, if it chose, engage in the practice of what Flight 
Centre termed “disintermediation” or, as it might less prosaically be described, “cutting out 
the middle man”. When they engaged in this practice of substitution the airlines became 
competitors in “the downstream or distribution functional level of the overarching market 
for international travel and ancillary products”. What the evidence also demonstrates is that 
the availability of the internet as a means of distribution and booking facilitated that 
substitution.  
(emphasis added) 
His Honour was assisted by the evidence of an expert economist, Dr Fitzgerald, that travel agents 
compete with international airlines at the retail level in the distribution services market in the sense 
that, if one makes a sale the other does not, and that they were competing with each other for the 
retail or distribution margin, which was the price for providing the booking and distribution services. 
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The airlines sometimes offered fares for particular air travel on the same flight that were not 
available to travel agents. Logan J found (at [29]) that during the relevant period there was a trend 
towards “…the ever greater use of the internet as a means of notifying the availability of, booking of 
and payment for international air travel by customers”. 
An important additional fact was that Flight Centre operated a “Price Beat” guarantee under which it 
would offer to better the price of any fare offered by another travel agent or a fare advertised by an 
airline on its website if the customer could produce evidence of a legitimate quote. In such 
circumstances, Flight Centre would better the alternative fare by $1 and provide the passenger with 
a voucher for $20. Flight Centre became concerned when it was required to honour the “Price Beat” 
guarantee because customers were able to obtain flights more cheaply on the airlines’ website fare 
offers, and these cheaper seats were not available for sale by travel agents. Flight Centre’s CEO, Mr 
Turner, tried to get access to these cheaper air fares on the GDS and sent emails to senior officers at 
Singapore Airlines. 
Logan J stated (at [101]): 
Flight Centre did not just want access to the same fare as the airline sold the air travel 
directly to the public; it wanted that fare to be made available to the GDS as a “published 
fare” on which it would earn commission. In short, it wanted Singapore Airlines to stop 
undercutting, by the fares it offered directly via its website, the published fare on the GDS 
for the same flight. In that way, Flight Centre’s commission margin on the fare would not be 
subject to the dramatic reduction that would occur if the fare were not made available to 
the GDS and, instead, Flight Centre were faced with the prospect, via its “Price Beat” policy, 
of having to better it as a fare otherwise available to customers via direct sale by the airline.
  
Earlier in his judgment (at [82]) Logan J said: 
Considering the evidence as a whole, what is revealed is a concerted pattern of reactive 
corporate conduct by Flight Centre, reactive to a threat it perceived to be presented by the 
direct retail offering by airlines of air travel at fares it could not offer to retail customers, as 
opposed to a series of unrelated, isolated, idiosyncratic aberrations. 
Finally, his Honour referred to evidence given by Flight Centre’s CEO, Mr Turner (at [196]): 
Mr Turner’s oral evidence, notably “it’s the access that’s important as well as the actual 
airfare itself and the margin” told only part of the story, the other he made crystal clear in 
item 2 of his email of 12 May 2009, “[a]n agreement that we will not be undercut on the 
web.” Viewed collectively, I consider that this email chain evidences the most blatant of all 
the charged attempts to induce. Mr Turner’s use of the word “undercut” is eloquent as to 
his purpose. He was seeking to eliminate air fare differentiation and thereby to fix, control or 
maintain Flight Centre’s retail or distribution margin. The threat or persuader is overt – 
Flight Centre and Singapore Airlines will go their separate ways with the airline not just 
losing the benefit of Flight Centre’s distribution network but having travel with other airlines 
promoted to would-be passengers.  
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Conclusion 
The two decisions involved similar distribution models and are difficult to reconcile. Both involved 
the role of agents or brokers in a vertical supply chain and the ultimate question for resolution being 
whether the agent or broker competed with the supplier in the supply of services to customers. In 
the ANZ case, Dowsett J found that mortgage brokers did not compete with ANZ’s branches or 
franchises in the supply of loan arrangements services to borrowers or for margins that would 
otherwise be retained within the banking group. In the Flight Centre case, Logan J found that travel 
agents did compete with the airlines in the supply of booking services to customers seeking 
international air travel; they competed with each other for the retail or distribution margin, which 
was the price for providing the booking and distribution services.  
As a result of these different characterisations of the services provided by the various parties, Flight 
Centre was found to have engaged in price fixing, while ANZ did not. In both cases the same expert 
economist, Dr Fitzgerald, gave evidence for the ACCC. In the Flight Centre case, Logan J was assisted 
by Dr Fitzgerald’s evidence, while in the ANZ case Dowsett J expressed doubts concerning certain 
assumptions and conclusions in Dr Fitzgerald’s evidence, and (at [587]) found his evidence as being 
“not consistent with the industry evidence” and “largely speculative”. 
ACCC has appealed against the decision of Dowsett J in the ANZ case. (See ACCC Media Release 
287/13 dated 10 December 2013). Flight Centre has also announced that it will appeal, so that the 
Full Federal Court will have to resolve the conflicting approaches adopted in the two cases. 
The question, when do agents and brokers compete with their suppliers, remains to be resolved. The 
question is an important one because of the ever-increasing use of the internet as a means by which 
suppliers can vertically integrate and “sell” directly to consumers. In some markets the internet 
allows suppliers or goods or services to eliminate the middleman altogether. Apple, for example, 
supplies music from its iTunes website direct to the consumer. However, there remain a large 
number of vertical supply arrangements in other sectors involving physical goods where suppliers 
rely on agents who are not independent contractors to display and sell their products and 
“compete” with them for sales at the retail level. If these agents are found to be the competitors of 
their suppliers in a distribution services market, it is likely to result in a move away from dual 
distribution towards more vertical integration in order to obtain immunity from the cartel provisions 
of the CCA. 
 
